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Because carbon taxes can lead to loss of competitiveness, applying tariffs on imports from non-carbon-
restricting countries helps address the cost disadvantage faced by producers in carbon-restricting 
countries. Such tariffs, known as border carbon adjustments ("BCAs"), can also help reduce possible 
carbon "leakage," or the growth in foreign emissions due to increased production of carbon-intensive 
goods in non-carbon-restricting countries. We demonstrate that BCAs that do not exceed the burdens 
imposed by carbon taxation on domestic like products could be consistent with World Trade Organization 
("WTO") rules. However, "neutral" (i.e., nondiscriminatory) BCAs might still be inefficiently high from a 
global welfare perspective. This stems from the misaligned focus of BCAs on imports rather than 
production—the real cause of emissions. The discrepancy between neutrality and efficiency enables 
carbon-restricted industries to seek inefficiently high BCAs. Recognition of this discrepancy strengthens 
the case for multilateral alternatives that curb global carbon emissions. (JEL: F13, F18, H23) 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
When nations cannot agree on binding emission cuts, unilateral attempts to internalize 
the social cost of carbon raise costs to carbon-restricting first movers, while allowing other 
nations to enjoy the benefit of a shared public good (i.e., mitigated climate change) without 
contributing to its cost (Stavins, 2014). Invariably, first movers are called to address the cost 
disadvantage that their carbon-intensive sectors face in international competition with 
counterparts in non-carbon-restricting nations. A border carbon adjustment ("BCA") constitutes 
a potential policy option in addressing this cost disadvantage.   
BCAs are border measures whose purpose is to offset the cost disadvantage producers of 
goods and services operating in emission-restricting countries face when in competition with 
more carbon-intensive imports from non- or more lax emission-restricting countries (Veel, 
2009). Besides putting industries on both sides of the border on a level playing field, such 
offsetting reduces potential leakage of carbon emissions.1 For this reason, BCAs increase the 
effectiveness of unilateral climate action, though they are a second-best alternative when 
compared to globally coordinated internalization measures, such as country-by-country, carbon 
taxation set at the rate of marginal damage. As far as implementation is concerned, BCAs can 
be enforced either by requiring importers to purchase emission allowances from an existing 
                                                 
1 The term carbon leakage illustrates two adverse economic effects that may result from a country's 
effort to reduce emissions: (i) higher emission costs may shift production of GHG-intensive goods and 
services to non-carbon-restricting nations, where such costs are not imposed, resulting in the growing 
emissions there; and (ii) the reduction in fossil fuel use in carbon-restricting nations may lower global 
energy prices, thereby inducing more energy consumption in non-carbon-restricting nations (Winchester 
et al., 2011; Her Majesty's Treasury, 2006).  
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emission-trading scheme and to relinquish such allowances when they clear imports from 
customs, or by subjecting imports to tariffs that adjust for their domestic carbon charges.  
Although BCAs have not yet been adopted by any country, their adoption is likely to be 
seriously considered by the European Union ("EU"), particularly as the EU-wide carbon 
Emissions Trading System ("ETS") moves towards auctioned allowances.2 During his term in 
office, France's President Sarkozy publicly voiced support for BCAs (Winchester et al., 2011). 
In the U.S., the Waxman-Markey Climate Change Bill of 2009, which passed the House of 
Representatives but died in the Senate, included a provision for BCAs.3  
BCAs have also received favorable endorsements from trade law experts. Many scholars 
have written persuasive articles about the legality of BCAs,4 and the World Trade Organization 
("WTO") Secretariat and the United Nations Environment Program ("UNEP") have jointly 
issued a white paper discussing the WTO-compatibility of different types of carbon-restricting 
border measures with WTO rules (WTO-UNEP, 2009). Yet, nearly all legal analyses resort to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' ("GATT") environmental conservation and public 
health exceptions. When applicable, these generous regulatory exceptions allow WTO Members 
                                                 
2 In 2009, the EU Parliament and the EU Council granted the EU Commission the power to alleviate 
the cost burden of ETS and put EU-based energy-intensive industries "on a comparable footing" by 
either increasing free emission allocations, or by introducing "an effective carbon equalisation system," 
which would be implemented through BCAs (Council Directive 2009/29, 2009). 
3 Also known as "Climate Bill" or "Waxman-Markey," the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009), called for the inclusion of "provisions that recognize and address 
the competitive imbalances" and potential for "carbon leakage" that might result from an international 
carbon-restricting agreement if some countries are allowed free ride without the possibility of remedies. 
Notably, in attempt to mitigate Sections 766-67's costly implicit endorsement of BCAs (and secure 
votes), Section 782(e)(1) would authorize granting free allowances to energy-intensive, "Trade-
Vulnerable Industries" (American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong., 2009).  
4 Among such scholars are: Colares, 2013; Tran, 2010; Veel, 2009; Howse and Eliason, 2008; 
Sindico, 2008; Zhang & Assunção, 2004. A few trade law experts have expressed skepticism in regard to 
the WTO-legality of BCAs. Joost Pauwelyn, for instance, states that "it remains unclear whether" BCA-
imposing Members would be able to overcome GATT art. II:2(a)'s restriction on "maximum tariff 
ceilings," because BCAs "target not the physical features of the imported product itself, but rather [its] 
process or production method" (Pauwelyn, 2007). Although not discussing BCAs specifically, Roessler 
(2003) has argued that "the only place to take into account regulatory objectives that require the products 
distinctions not made by the market is Article XX of the GATT," ruling out, presumably, the legality of 
regulatory measures without resort to one of the exceptions under GATT, art. XX. GATT stands for 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (see GATT (1947) in References).   
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to deviate from the trade system's preference for tariff-based measures, even permitting 
Members to impose bans—the most trade-restrictive measure—and non-neutral BCAs.  
Due to the legal permissiveness of GATT regulatory exceptions, protectionism could 
find an easier entry into the border adjustment process under the cloak of exempted 
environmentalism. While a legal argument premised solely on the neutrality of border 
adjustments (i.e., not relying on GATT exceptions) would seem more compelling as a matter of 
policy, it would be fairly controversial as a matter of law because such measures rely on the 
elimination of environmental tax differentials based on unincorporated Process and Production 
Methods ("u-PPMs"). To date, no WTO (or pre-WTO) report has approved "tax" equalizations 
based on production process characteristics that target unincorporated inputs (e.g., emissions). 
To be clear, even if an importing country demonstrates that it adjusts only for the burden that 
product taxes or charges impose on domestic like products—such burden being at most 
equivalent to the carbon tax or charge imposed on the domestically produced good—it would be 
hard to demonstrate GATT-consistency where the adjustment in question was not based on a 
physically incorporated feature of the final product.   
However, even assuming neutral BCAs were adjudged GATT-consistent without the use 
of a regulatory exception—a result we do not intend to prove in this article—no GATT 
provision requires that externality-internalizing measures optimally offset the environmental 
harm they are meant to address. Trade rules proscribe treatment that affords protection, not the 
imposition of measures that come short of maximizing welfare. Thus, the possibility that neutral 
BCAs—the most benign BCAs and the benchmark for our analysis—might be GATT-exempted 
should invite serious scrutiny if BCAs prove to be significantly inefficient from domestic and 
global welfare perspectives. Yet, only one trade law article has even mentioned the possibility 
of an "optimality gap" between a WTO-consistent measure and global (or even domestic) 
welfare (Horn and Mavroidis, 2011; Horn, 2006 (economics article)). As of this writing, no 
legal or economic research has sought to explain, much less formalize, how that gap emerges.   
As Grossman and Helpman (1994) and others have illustrated, trade policy is not 
determined in a vacuum but is the outcome of a political process that can include rent-seeking 
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activity by industries.5   Producers in carbon-restricting countries would naturally favor the 
imposition of BCAs as they serve to "level the playing field" vis-à-vis competitors in non-
carbon-restricting countries. While BCAs that equalize the level of exaction on imports to the 
level of exaction imposed on domestic like products seem intuitively fair and legally tenable (at 
least under one GATT exception), they may not be defensible on the grounds of economic 
efficiency.   
This article provides the first exploration of how neutral BCAs relate to economic 
efficiency. To do so, we translate neutrality into an analytical construct that enables 
comparisons with efficiency, which, commonly, is expressed in analytical terms. Through a 
general equilibrium model that takes our neutral BCA benchmark as the starting point, we 
characterize economically efficient BCAs and show how they relate to the domestic carbon tax 
(or equivalent measure). We find that when the carbon-restricting country taxes carbon at the 
efficient rate, the BCA levels that maximize global welfare are lower than those permitted under 
the neutrality ceiling. The intuition for this finding is that BCAs, while combating the source of 
the negative externality (i.e., production resulting in emissions in non-carbon-restricting 
countries), simultaneously encourage consumption of carbon-intensive goods in non-carbon-
restricting countries. We go on to show that for goods whose supply in the carbon-restricted 
country is highly price-elastic and whose production in the non-carbon-restricting country is 
highly carbon-intensive, the welfare-maximizing BCA levels are likely to be below those 
permitted under the neutrality ceiling, regardless of the domestic carbon tax rate imposed in the 
restricting country. 
This discrepancy between neutrality and efficiency opens the door for industries to 
lobby for and secure inefficiently high BCAs that are WTO-compliant. Our analysis reveals that 
the trade law literature focus on GATT-compliant BCAs, although important, misses a 
fundamental point: GATT legality, however achieved, must be contextualized and enriched by 
the concept of economic efficiency. Otherwise, the world risks disregarding lower-cost, neutral 
alternatives (e.g., country-by-country taxation that prices in the environmental cost of emissions 
                                                 
5 Briefly stated, rent-seeking refers to economic actors' pursuit of narrow, concentrated, unearned 
benefits or collective goods (i.e., rents), provided by governments through legislation or other public 
means, that imposes socially spread distributed costs. Tollison originally defined rent-seeking as the 
"activity of wasting resources in competing for artificially contrived transfers." (Tollison, 1982).  
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arising from production activities). Only such alternatives can provide a sufficiently robust 
argument for global coordination on carbon emissions.  
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section I translates neutrality into 
analytical terms by formalizing the WTO non-discrimination principles. Being non-
discriminatory, such benign BCAs still seek to equalize carbon taxes on the basis of 
unincorporated inputs to production processes, which, under the prevailing view, require resort 
to the environmental exception under GATT art. XX. 6  Section II describes the economic 
environment and the equilibrium of the model; Section III characterizes the optimal BCAs and 
compares these to neutral BCAs; Section IV considers extensions to the model, particularly two 
possible responses by the unregulated country: the subsequent imposition of an emissions tax 
and the adoption of cleaner production technologies in response to BCAs. Section IV also 
considers the case where the carbon-regulating country sets its BCAs with an objective other 
than global welfare. Because we demonstrate that neutral BCAs can be exposed to industry rent-
seeking and, thus, further deviate from optimality, we conclude by recommending resort to 
multilaterally negotiated emission reductions as the preferred solution to this coordination 
problem.   
I. Domestic Climate Policy, Neutrality and GATT Article XX 
In WTO parlance, neutrality means not discriminating between foreign and domestic 
products or among foreign products. Non-discrimination between foreign and domestic products 
or the National Treatment ("NT") Principle is a requirement of GATT art. III,7 while non-
discrimination among foreign products or the Most Favored Nation ("MFN") Principle is a 
requirement of GATT art. I.8 Note that many commentators have argued for the GATT-legality 
                                                 
6 Specifically, GATT art. XX(g)'s exception, commonly known as "GATT's environmental" 
exception, allowing derogation from free trade to domestic measures "relat[ed] to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources."  
7 Henceforth, unless otherwise indicated, we use the terms NT-neutrality and neutrality 
interchangeably. 
8 While we formalize MFN-neutrality in this Section, we discuss it separately, in more detail, in 
Appendix A.2.   
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of BCAs by resorting to the GATT Article XX(g) exception,9 which we discuss in Section I.B. 
To these scholars, the problem with BCAs that requires resort to the exception stems not from 
deviations from neutrality, but from their targeting emissions as an unincorporated production 
input (i.e., the u-PPM issue). While we understand the literature's focus on the u-PPM 
controversy, we begin by first defining neutral BCAs as a benchmark. We hope that WTO 
jurisprudence evolves beyond the u-PPM question, eventually making BCAs less controversial. 
Our use of neutral BCAs reflects our support for adopting the more efficient policy option 
among BCAs, in case optimal domestic emission-pricing measures are not universally adopted. 
If deemed WTO-consistent, neutral BCAs should help the trade system avoid opening the door 
to worse options.  
A. Formalizing Neutral BCAs 
Suppose a good i is produced in two countries: Home (H) and Foreign (F). Carbon 
emissions are proportional to the production of good i, but the emissions intensity of production 
may differ across jurisdictions. Each unit of output produced in Home results in Hi tons of 
carbon emissions, while each unit produced in Foreign results in Fi tons. Producers in Home 
face a tax on carbon emissions, which we represent as an output tax, denoted tHi.10 In contrast, 
Foreign is a non-carbon-restricting jurisdiction where producers pollute at no cost. However, 
Home can impose a BCA in the form of a tariff, i, on imports from Foreign.11 
The NT-principle describes a relationship of non-discrimination between Home's carbon 
measure on the domestically produced good and its BCA on the imported good. Under a NT-
                                                 
9 Note 4 provides a list of these commentators. Despite some BCA-skepticism, Pauwelyn (2007) 
argues that "[a] U.S. carbon tax or emission credit requirement or other regulation on imports can still be 
justified under GATT Article XX." 
10 Because emissions are proportional to output, a tax on emissions can be represented as a (good-
specific) tax on output. This representation also applies if, instead of a tax, the emissions regulation takes 
the form of a cap-and-trade program where permits for emissions must be bought at a market price. (We 
assume each producer is a price-taker in the emission-permit market). 
11 An import tariff would apply if Home is a net importer of the good. If Home is a net exporter, the 
corresponding BCA measure would be an export rebate. The analytical representation is the same as the 
tariffs interpreted as a subsidy when net imports are negative. As we are primarily interested in the case 
where Home imports the polluting good, the ensuing discussion is framed in terms of tariffs. However, 
we do address the legal basis for export rebates in Appendix A.1. 
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neutral BCA, the carbon content of imported goods (Fi) cannot be taxed at a higher rate than 
that of domestically produced goods (Hi). Thus, a tariff, i, qualifies as neutral if: 
ఛ೔
ఈಷ೔ ൑
௧ಹ೔
ఈಹ೔ (1) 
Figure 1 (see below) graphically illustrates the relationship between Home's carbon measure 
and a NT-neutral BCA. Instead of output, we have used carbon emissions as the measuring unit; 
hence the horizontal and vertical axes are 	 ௧ಹ೔ఈಹ೔  and 	
ఛ೔
ఈಷ೔   respectively. The 45-degree line 
demarcates the highest possible import tariff that satisfies NT-neutrality for any given carbon 
tax at Home. 12  Formalizing neutrality thusly allows for intuitive comparisons with the 
efficiency-based concepts we introduce later in Sections II-IV. 
Figure 1: Neutral Tariff as Function of Home Emissions Tax 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GATT's other neutrality requirement, the MFN-principle, can also be expressed 
analytically. Assume a second foreign country, denoted ܨ෨  that does not mitigate emissions 
                                                 
12 As Poterba and Rotemberg (1995) explain, "when it is possible to measure the amount of the taxed 
intermediate good that is used to produce an imported final good, an import tax equal to the tax on the 
intermediate good times the amount of the intermediate good used in domestic production of the final 
good will raise the marginal cost of domestic and foreign producers by the same amount."  
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either. A unit of good i produced in ܨ෨ results in ߙி෨௜ tons of carbon emissions. Let  ߬̃௜ denote the 
tariff on Home's imports from ܨ෨. The tariffs ߬௜ and ߬̃௜ are consistent with the MFN-principle if:  
ఛ೔
ఈಷ೔ ൌ
ఛ෤೔		
ఈಷ෩೔
 (2) 
This analytical structure, relating domestic carbon measures, tariffs and carbon 
intensities forms the basis of our legal and economic analysis. Section I.B discusses briefly the 
legal basis for implementing neutral BCAs in light of pre- and post-WTO, GATT 
jurisprudence.13 While Section I.B addresses the core legal issues pertaining to product BCAs, 
non-lawyers, willing to bypass this important discussion, may skip to Section II where we 
provide a formal analysis of the efficiency of NT-neutral BCAs.  
B. BCAs and the Process and Production Method ("PPM") Controversy 
Because BCAs would effectively extend domestic u-PPM regulations to imports, 
reliance on GATT art. XX's environmental exception might be necessary if BCAs are to be 
deployed in a GATT-consistent manner.14 While, to date, WTO Members have not implemented 
BCAs, GATT has allowed the imposition of border tax adjustments ("BTAs") on inputs 
incorporated into the final imported product. All GATT has required is for Members imposing 
BTAs not to tax imports in excess of domestic like products.15  Indeed, trade adjudicators have 
both approved and struck down BTAs depending on whether they satisfy or violate this 
equivalence condition.16  
                                                 
13 By the express language of Article 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, the 
provisions of GATT remain effective "as rectified, amended or modified by the terms of the" more 
recent WTO agreements (see GATT (1994) in References).  Since 1995, WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body have deliberated and made rulings on disputes submitted by aggrieved Members under the 
supervision of the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"), established pursuant to Article 2(1) of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.  
14 In another paper, Colares (2017) makes a more parsimonious argument that reliance on GATT art. 
XX is not necessary to secure WTO approval of neutral BCAs.  
15 Textually, GATT art. II:2(a) refers to "a charge equivalent to an internal tax" that is consistent 
with art. III:2. Article III:2 requires, in turn, parity of border measures with "internal taxes or other 
internal charges of any kind" (GATT, 1947). Thus, by referring to taxes or charges interchangeably, both 
provisions do not refer to "taxes" in a strict sense.  
16 For instance, compare US–Petroleum and Imported Substances Taxes or Superfund (1987), ¶¶ 2.3-
2.4 & 3.1.1, a GATT Panel Report upholding a U.S. BTA on certain chemicals and on certain substances 
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1. Bans, BTAs and PPMs 
Both GATT drafting history and jurisprudence look favorably on adjustments for 
indirect taxes on inputs embodied in final products.17 In particular, at least one prior decision 
upheld a BTA corresponding to an environmental internal tax. The GATT panel in United 
States–Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances heard a challenge under GATT 
art. III:2 (and implicitly under GATT art. II:2(a)) to U.S. legislation that imposed a BTA on 
certain chemicals and on certain substances made from such chemicals, all of which had been 
subject to a domestic tax (the so-called "Superfund" tax) (US–Petroleum and Imported 
Substances Taxes or Superfund, 1987). The GATT panel, following the Legal Drafting 
Committee's views on BTAs, held that so long as (i) the environmental BTA is an adjustment 
for a domestic tax imposed on products, the only remaining issue is (ii) whether the BTA is 
nondiscriminatory. After making affirmative determinations on both questions, the panel 
approved the U.S. BTA.  
Because carbon emissions are not physically embodied in final products (i.e., emissions 
are "unincorporated," in WTO parlance), one cannot rely solely on the Superfund decision to 
make the case for the WTO-compatibility of emissions-based tariffs (Pauwelyn, 2007). 18 
Indeed, before creation of the WTO, two unadopted GATT Panel Reports struck down U.S. 
bans on imported tuna not harvested under conditions that minimized incidental dolphin deaths, 
an unincorporated PPM ("u-PPM") requirement imposed on domestic shrimpers (Report of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
made from petroleum that had been subject to an equivalent domestic tax, with India–Additional Duties 
(2008), ¶¶ 214, 221, a WTO Panel Report striking down India's BTAs "insofar as [they] result[ed] in the 
imposition of charges on imports . . . in excess of excise duties . . . sales taxes, value-added taxes and 
other local taxes and charges" applied on domestic like products (emphases added). The secondary 
literature has made tentative arguments for the compatibility of BCAs with GATT arts. II:2(a) and III:2 
(see sources in note 4 and WTO-UNEP (2009). We shall not repeat those arguments here.  
17 For instance, in the early decades of GATT, the Legal Drafting Committee, commenting on GATT 
art. II:2(a), observed that a charge "equivalent" to an internal tax could be "imposed on perfume because 
it contains alcohol," explaining that such a charge "must take into consideration the value of the content 
and not the value of the whole" (GATT Analytical Index, 2017).  
18 While noting that "the [Superfund] panel did not specify whether [the covered] chemicals still had 
to be physically present in the imported product" to be subject to a tariff, Pauwelyn (2007) indicates that 
"[n]o GATT or WTO decision was ever rendered on . . . a . . . [tax or tariff], not related to the physical 
characteristics of the final imported product." De Cendra (2006), referring approvingly to Superfund, 
also posits that "doubts over the capability of GATT . . . to tolerate BTAs coupled with emission trading 
schemes make an analysis . . . of Article XX of GATT necessary." 
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Panel, US–Tuna/Dolphin II, 1991; Report of the Panel, US–Tuna/Dolphin I, 1982). Resort to 
authority under the GATT art. XX environmental exception appears as the most likely route for 
BCA approval under the WTO system.   
Among WTO cases invoking such exception, the 2001 Appellate Body Report in United 
States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Recourse to Article 21.5 by 
Malaysia), upholding a U.S. import ban based on a u-PPM requirement (Appellate Body 
Report, US–Shrimp/Turtle Compliance, 2001), holds most promise for BCAs.19 The challenged 
U.S. measure—requiring the use of turtle excluder devices ("TEDs") on trawling nets to reduce 
the incidental bycatch of sea turtles, a protected species—was deemed justified under GATT 
art. XX(g)'s environmental exception, which gives Members discretion to adopt pro-
environment border measures "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption."20  
Specifically, Malaysia argued that "condition[ing] access to [a] market on compliance 
with policies and standards 'unilaterally' prescribed by the [importing Member] constituted . . . 
'arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination'" (Appellate Body Report, US–Shrimp/Turtle 
Compliance, 2001). In response, however, the Appellate Body ruled that imposing "regulatory 
programmes comparable in effectiveness to that of the importing Member gives sufficient 
latitude to the exporting Member" to implement measures that "achieve the level of 
effectiveness required" (id. at ¶ 144), thus allowing the latter to avoid the ban. In the Appellate 
Body's view, so long as border measures are flexible enough to accommodate varying but 
"comparably effective" methods of regulation prevailing abroad, Members are free to adopt 
environmentally motivated border measures (id. at ¶ 148). 
2. A Cautious Legal Case for GATT-Consistent, Neutral BCAs 
                                                 
19 This particular Report discussed two important, prior Reports that will also be mentioned in the 
following discussion, namely: Panel Report, United States–Shrimp/Turtle (1998); and Appellate Body 
Report, US–Shrimp/Turtle (1998). As before, full cites appear in References.   
20 Note that to qualify for a GATT art. XX(g) exception, a Responding Member must also comply 
with the strictures of the Article's chapeau, namely, the measure cannot be "applied in a manner [that] 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or [be] a disguised restriction on international trade . . ." (GATT, 1947). 
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While US–Shrimp/Turtle Compliance is most recognized for its reliance on a GATT 
regulatory exception to uphold a pro-environment ban, it is also noteworthy for marking the 
Appellate Body's first approval of a border measure that effectively implemented a u-PPM 
requirement (id. at ¶¶ 147-48). Surprisingly, nowhere in that ruling did the Appellate Body feel 
compelled to comment on the full implications of such a momentous decision. To the Appellate 
Body, the controlling question was, rather, whether the importing country's border measure 
accommodates "comparably effective" regulatory "programmes" in exporting countries. 
Although we recognize that the Appellate Body has yet to consider precisely whether tariffs 
implementing u-PPM requirements are GATT-compatible and note that this question remains 
controversial, US–Shrimp/Turtle Compliance's endorsement of a ban enforcing a u-PPM is 
unequivocal. 21  Allowing importing Members to invoke GATT art. XX(g) to justify bans 
enforcing u-PPMs, yet not allowing Members to adopt trade-neutral tariff adjustments that do 
the same would not seem sensible. Bans are unquestionably the more trade-restrictive border 
measure. 
Yet, BCA approval under Article XX(g) could be too permissive: carbon-intensive 
imports from non-carbon-restricting Members could be banned altogether for lack of a measure 
of "comparable effectiveness," regardless of the actual carbon intensity of such imports.22 
Clearly, in this instance, a ban would not be commensurate with the domestic measure—only a 
tariff could be. Furthermore, neutral BCAs, unlike bans, appear within the policy space 
contained in the shaded region of Figure 1 and have an analytical structure that allows nontrivial 
comparisons in terms of their relative efficiency.   
                                                 
21 Whether such endorsement extends to BCAs is discussed in another trade law paper: Colares, 
2017.  
22 This point is particularly important in light of trade lawyers' and trade economists' heavy reliance 
on Article XX arguments when discussing BCAs (e.g., Tran, 2010 (law); Ismer and Neuhoff (2004) 
(applied economics)). Horn and Mavroidis (2011) remain, to date, the only trade law scholars to have 
offered a legal analysis supporting BCAs where Article XX(g) is scarcely mentioned. The duo uses legal 
interpretive techniques to support the conclusion—also correct in our view—that GATT art. II:2(a) 
allows tariffs equivalent to art. III:2-consistent internal taxes in the case of u-PPMs (id.; Horn and 
Mavroidis, 2010). Notably, they are also the first legal scholars to extensively discuss the possibility of 
BCA deployment for protectionist purposes (Horn and Mavroidis, 2011).  Even trade law scholars who 
are lukewarm to BCAs—for reasons not related to efficiency—also rely heavily on GATT art. XX 
rationales (Pauwelyn, 2007).  
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This concludes our legal analysis of neutral BCAs under the WTO regime. Legally 
inclined readers may refer to Appendix A.1 for a discussion of how Home's carbon taxes can be 
rebated on export transactions without running afoul of WTO subsidy disciplines. Appendix A.2 
explains how BCAs can be compatible with MFN-neutrality (i.e., the requirement not to 
discriminate on the basis of national origin). As explained above, theoretical and 
methodological parsimony compels us to consider only neutral BCAs in the formal analysis that 
follows. Even if such BCAs are eventually upheld as WTO-compatible, they might still be far 
from optimal from domestic and global welfare standpoints.  
II. Formalizing BCAs: Carbon Taxes, Import Tariffs and Trade Equilibrium 
A. First Steps 
We develop an economic model in which trade takes place between two large countries- 
Home and Foreign. Emissions of carbon are a byproduct of goods production and cause a global 
negative externality. Producers in Home face a price on carbon emissions. In contrast, Foreign 
is a non-carbon-restricting jurisdiction where producers pollute at no cost. However, Home may 
pursue a BCA in the form of tariffs on imports from Foreign (or export rebates if Home is an 
exporter). It should be highlighted that our analysis takes place in a second-best setting in which 
the first-best policy option (i.e., a country-by-country tax on carbon emissions set at the rate of 
marginal damage) is not politically feasible. 
B. Economic Environment 
1. Consumption, Production and Externalities 
The number of consumers in Home and Foreign is denoted by NH and NF, respectively. 
In each country, consumers consume a numeraire good (indexed 0), produced by labor alone, 
and n non-numeraire goods (indexed	1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊), produced using labor and a sector-specific 
input.23 Individuals have identical quasilinear and additively separable preferences over the 
goods. Utility maximization subject to a budget constraint leads to an individual demand 
                                                 
23 In both countries, we assume each sector-specific input is in inelastic supply and aggregate labor 
supply is also inelastic. Labor supply in each country is assumed to be large enough such that each 
country's equilibrium consumption of the numeraire good is positive. This ensures that the equilibrium 
wage rate equals 1. 
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function, di, for each good	݅ ൌ 0, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊. Let DHi and DFi denote aggregate Home and Foreign 
consumption demand.24 
All goods are produced using constant-returns-to-scale technology and are sold under 
perfect competition. Let YHi and YFi denote Home and Foreign output of good i respectively, and 
let ΠHi and ΠFi denote the total rents accruing to the good i-specific input, in Home and Foreign 
respectively. 
Carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere during the production of the n non-
numeraire goods. We assume carbon emissions are proportional to output but allow the 
emissions intensity of production to differ both by good and by location of production. Global 
carbon emissions from production of good i (denoted Ei) are: 
ܧ௜ ൌ ߙு௜ ுܻ௜ ൅ ߙி௜ ிܻ௜, (3) 
where ߙு௜ and ߙி௜ are the respective Home and Foreign emissions intensities. As carbon is not 
a local pollutant, damage depends on the total quantity of emissions from all sources worldwide. 
We express per-capita damage from carbon emissions as a function of total global emissions: 
v(E), with ܧ ≡ 	∑ ܧ௜௡௜ୀଵ .25 
2. Emissions Taxes and Import Tariffs 
Producers in Home must pay a price for emitting carbon. We represent this as an output 
tax on good i, denoted tHi.26 Moreover, Home can impose a BCA in the form of tariffs on 
imports from Foreign. An import tariff on good i (τi) creates a wedge between its world price 
(pi) and its domestic producer and consumer prices. An emissions tax, in contrast, imposes an 
added cost on production and creates a wedge between domestic producer and consumer prices. 
Thus, the Home consumer price for good i is pi + τi, while the Home producer price is pi + τi - 
                                                 
24 DHi = NH * di; DFi = NF * di. 
25 For purposes of the model, the damage is assumed to be the same for all individuals worldwide. 
26 Because emissions are proportional to output, with each good produced under a specific emission 
intensity, a tax on emissions can be represented as a good-specific tax on output. As discussed 
previously, this representation also applies in the case of a permit price in a cap-and-trade program: we 
assume each producer is a price-taker in the emissions permit market—an extension of the perfect 
competition assumption. 
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tHi. We assume the Home government redistributes the tax and tariff revenue uniformly to all NH 
individuals. 
3. Trade Equilibrium 
Market clearing requires world supply to equal world demand for each good, or 
equivalently, Home imports to equal Foreign exports. Formally, for each good i:  
ܦு௜ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻ െ ுܻ௜ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ െ ݐு௜ሻ ൌ ிܻ௜ሺ݌௜ሻ െ ܦி௜ሺ݌௜ሻ (4) 
where DHi and DFi are Home and Foreign demand functions, and YHi and YFi are the Home and 
Foreign supply functions for each good i. 
Because Home is a large country, any change in taxes or tariffs affects equilibrium world 
prices. A marginal increase in the emissions tax, by raising Home production costs, has the 
effect of raising the equilibrium world price (pi). In contrast, a marginal increase in the tariff 
lowers the world price by dampening Home demand. We denote these effects ߲݌௜/߲ݐு௜ ≡ ߜ௜ 
and	߲݌௜/߲߬௜ ≡ െ߶௜. Note that ߜ௜ and ߶௜ always lie between 0 and 1.27 
In summary, the need for BCAs arises solely because Home's environmental measure 
(i.e., emissions tax) raises equilibrium world prices, thereby stimulating production and 
emissions in Foreign. Conversely, the effectiveness of BCAs in curbing Foreign emissions 
stems entirely from their ability to depress world prices. Without consideration of these general 
equilibrium effects, an economic model of BCAs would be a non-starter.    
III. Optimal Tariffs 
A. Components of Welfare 
                                                 
27 Appendix B.1 provides full derivations of ߜ௜ and ߶௜. Because	ߜ௜ lies between 0 and 1, a ceteris 
paribus marginal increase in the tax (tHi) results in a lower Home producer price (pi + τi – tHi), even after 
considering the effect on the world price (pi) in equilibrium. The increase in the tax leads to a higher 
Home consumer price (pi + τi), however, solely through the higher world price (pi). Similarly, because ߶௜ lies between 0 and 1, a ceteris paribus marginal increase in the tariff (τi) results in a higher Home 
producer price and consumer price. 
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In the economic environment just described, global welfare comprises aggregate income 
(i.e., labor income, rents from sector-specific input, tax and tariff revenue)28 and consumer 
surplus, less the damage from emissions.  
It is evident that taxes and tariffs not only affect overall global welfare, but also create 
winners and losers through their impact on producer and consumer prices. Home producers are 
hurt by an emissions tax, but benefit from an import tariff as the former effectively lowers the 
producer price, while the latter raises it. In contrast, Foreign producers benefit from Home's 
emissions tax, which raises the world price, but are hurt by any import tariff imposed by Home. 
Taxes and tariffs also affect consumer surplus in both Home and Foreign. Home consumer 
surplus is reduced by both the tax and tariff as both lead to a higher consumer price.29 Foreign 
consumer surplus is decreasing in Home's tax but increasing in the tariff. Aside from these 
changes in consumer surplus, consumers in both Home and Foreign also benefit from any 
reductions in environmental damage due the tax and tariff. 
The problem of leakage arises when Home imposes an emissions tax that is not 
accompanied by a tariff on Home imports. While the tax has the effect of lowering Home 
production, it also raises the world price, thus leading to an increase in Foreign production of 
good i equal to δi * (∂YFi/∂pi). The increase in emissions from higher Foreign production may 
exceed the reductions due to lower Home production and possibly lead to a net increase in total 
global emissions, depending on differences in emissions intensities in Foreign and Home. 
The efficiency consequences of import tariffs are also salient. While tariffs raise 
revenue, combat Foreign emissions and benefit Home producers, they also create deadweight 
loss by distorting consumption decisions. While taxes (tHi) correct for a negative externality by 
precisely targeting it at its source (i.e. supply), tariffs (τi) take aim at supply and demand 
equally.30 Deadweight loss arises due to a distortion in the consumer price signal, even though 
the externality is entirely on the supply side. In short, tariffs are an imperfect policy instrument 
                                                 
28 The same setup applies if instead of an emissions tax, there exists a cap-and-trade program in 
Home. The tax revenue component would instead be revenue from permit sales. 
29 Although we do not explicitly model it, producers who purchase an intermediate good as an input 
to producing a final good (e.g., car manufacturers, with tires as an intermediate good) are hurt by import 
tariffs on the intermediate good. 
30 This is evident through the direct effect of tariffs on the Home consumer price. 
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for reducing global emissions because they target imports rather than Foreign production. Due 
to this inherent imperfection, even the most well-meaning BCAs cannot achieve the first-best 
outcome for maximizing global welfare; the first-best is only achieved through a uniform tax on 
emissions in both Home and Foreign, set at a rate equal to the marginal damage.31 We are thus 
dealing with a setting where only second- or third-best policy options are viable. In the 
following proposition, we establish that in a setting without a worldwide emissions tax, global 
welfare is maximized through an emissions tax at Home set equal to the rate of global marginal 
damage, along with import tariffs that are lower than the rate of global marginal damage. 
B. Maximizing Global Welfare 
Proposition 1 (Second-Best Policy for Global Welfare, without Foreign Emissions 
Tax):32 
When the only available policy instruments are an emissions tax at Home along with 
import tariffs, the second-best level of global welfare is achieved by setting taxes: 
ݐு௜∗∗ ൌ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻߙு௜ݒ′ሺܧሻ (5) 
and tariffs: 
߬௜∗∗ ൌ ሺேಹାேಷሻఈಷ೔௩
ᇲሺாሻ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ
௒ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ
, (6) 
where v'(E) is the marginal individual damage from emissions, 	Y୊୧ᇱ ሺ݌௜ሻ ൐ 0 is the slope of the 
Foreign supply curve and ܦ୊୧ᇱ ሺ݌௜ሻ ൏ 0 is the slope of the Foreign demand curve at pi. 
While it remains optimal to tax Home emissions at the rate of marginal damage, the 
optimal import tariffs are actually less than the marginal damage.33 The motivation for this 
result comes from the fact that it is production, not imports, that generates harmful emissions. 
                                                 
31 Formally, the tax at Home should be set to ݐு௜ ൌ ሺܰு ൅ ிܰሻߙு௜ݒ′ሺܧሻ while the tax in Foreign should be set to	ݐி௜ ൌ ሺܰு ൅ ிܰሻߙி௜ݒ′ሺܧሻ. 
32 Please refer to Appendix B.2 for a proof of this proposition. Balistreri et al. (2014) provide a 
version of this proposition, and Markusen (1975) formalizes the theory of cross-border pollution 
taxation. 
33 Specifically, ߬௜∗∗ is equal to the marginal damage multiplied by ௒ಷ೔
ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ
௒ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ
, which is less than 
one. 
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Taking aim at imports, which are a net quantity of production less consumption, generates 
deadweight loss by distorting consumption decisions, and, for this reason, the optimal tariffs are 
less than the marginal damage. 
Neutrality permits higher tariffs than	߬௜∗∗. If Home production of good i is subject to the 
carbon tax represented by	ݐு௜∗∗ , neutrality allows the tariff to be as high as ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻߙி௜ݒ′ሺܧሻ 
(i.e., the global marginal damage from Foreign production). 
We now consider a scenario where Home already imposes a tax on emissions at a 
previously determined rate, which may not equal the rate of marginal damage. This scenario 
represents a third-best setting where import tariffs are the only policy lever available. The 
situation in the EU can be conceived along these lines. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
already imposes a previously decided emissions cap that is embodied in the permit price. Given 
the existing policy, what are the optimal BCAs the EU should adopt? The fundamental policy 
determination to be made at this point is: what are the optimal import tariffs for global welfare 
given the preexisting tax, and do these tariffs meet the criterion of neutrality? 
Proposition 2 (Optimal Tariffs for Global Welfare, Given a Preexisting Emissions 
Tax):34 
If Home already imposes a previously determined emissions tax represented by tax rates 
̂ݐு௜ for goods	݅ ൌ 1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊, the optimal import tariffs are: 
߬పෝ∗∗ ൌ ߬௜∗∗ െ ൣሺேಹାேಷሻఈಹ೔௩
ᇲሺாሻି௧መಹ೔൧ሺଵିథ೔ሻ௒ಹ೔ᇲ
థ೔∗ൣ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ൧
. (7) 
The first term in ߬పෝ∗∗  is simply 	߬௜∗∗ , which is already below marginal damage. 
Furthermore, a second term incorporating the preexisting emissions tax can bring the optimal 
tariffs even further below marginal damage.35 Specifically, compared to a tax that is set at 
marginal damage, a tax that is set below marginal damage warrants tariffs that are even further 
below marginal damage. However, the tax-tariff relationship does not exactly align with 
neutrality. In the special case where ̂ݐு௜ ൌ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻߙு௜ݒ′ሺܧሻ, i.e., the tax equals marginal 
damage, Proposition 1 establishes unambiguously that the efficient tariff is strictly less than the 
                                                 
34 Please refer to Appendix B.3 for a proof of this proposition. 
35 In the case where the tax is set optimally to equal marginal damage, the second term vanishes. 
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highest permitted tariff under neutrality (i.e., ఛഢෝ ∗∗ఈಷ೔ is strictly less than 
௧መಹ೔
ఈಹ೔). We can characterize 
when this situation holds, more generally, by comparing ఛഢෝ ∗∗ఈಷ೔ with 
௧መಹ೔
ఈಹ೔ for any arbitrarily selected 
̂ݐு௜. It turns out that the key variables for this comparison are the emissions intensities and the 
price-responsiveness of supply and demand in Home and Foreign. 
While the mathematical details can be found in Appendix B.4, we focus here on 
sufficient conditions under which the efficient tariff is guaranteed to be strictly less than the 
highest permitted tariff under neutrality. Of particular significance is the net change in global 
emissions due to a marginal increase in the tariff (given a fixed ̂ݐு௜). Marginally increasing the 
tariff has two opposing effects on global emissions. On one hand, it leads to lower Foreign 
production, and consequently lower Foreign emissions, brought about through a lower world 
price. On the other hand, it leads to increased Home production and emissions. Formally, the 
decrease in Foreign emissions is	߶௜ߙி௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ . The increase in Home emissions is	ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻߙு௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ . 
Proposition 3 (Sufficient Conditions to Ensure	ఛഢෝ ∗∗ఈಷ೔ ൏
௧መಹ೔
ఈಹ೔):
36 
If Foreign production of good i is at least as emission-intensive as Home production of 
good i (i.e., αFi ≥ αHi), and a marginal increase in the tariff on good i raises Home emissions by 
as much or more than it lowers Foreign emissions (i.e., 	ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻߙு௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ െ ߶௜ߙி௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ ൒ 0 ), 
then	ఛഢෝ ∗∗ఈಷ೔ ൏
௧መಹ೔
ఈಹ೔. 
We use the term "susceptible goods" to refer to goods that always meet the conditions of 
Proposition 3, regardless of the level of	̂ݐு௜.37 Proposition 1 established that for all goods, the 
efficient tariff is below the maximum neutral tariff when ̂ݐு௜  is set at the rate of marginal 
damage. However, for susceptible goods, the efficient tariff is below the maximum neutral tariff 
no matter where ̂ݐு௜ is set. Although it is admittedly difficult to decisively identify a given good 
in the real world as "susceptible," the conditions of Proposition 3 do at least suggest some 
guidelines. Particularly, a good i is more likely to be susceptible if: (i) Foreign production of 
                                                 
36 Please refer to Appendix B.4 for a proof of this proposition. 
37 It should be emphasized that Proposition 3 outlines sufficient conditions to ensure	߬ෝ݅ ∗∗ఈಷ೔ ൏
௧መಹ೔
ఈಹ೔. As shown in Appendix B.4, the necessary conditions are weaker than those in Proposition 3. 
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good i is at least as emission intensive as Home production of good i ; and (ii) the Home supply 
of good i is much more responsive to price than the Foreign supply of good i (i.e., ுܻ௜ᇱ ൐ ிܻ௜ᇱ ). 
Susceptible goods are of particular concern from a policy standpoint. For these goods, 
regardless of the Home emissions tax, NT-neutrality will not foreclose tariffs set at above the 
economically efficient level. 
Figure 2 (see below) graphically displays Equation (7) for a susceptible good. The solid 
diagonal curve depicts the optimal tariffs and it must go through the coordinate: 
ቆሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻݒᇱሺܧሻ, ሺேಹାேಷሻ௩
ᇲሺாሻ௒ಷ೔ᇲ
௒ಷ೔ᇲ ି஽ಷ೔ᇲ
ቇ, (8) 
which corresponds to the second-best outcome from Proposition 1.38 As in Figure 1, we have 
used carbon emissions as the measuring unit; hence the horizontal and vertical axes are	 ௧ಹ೔ఈಹ೔ 
and 	 ఛ೔ఈಷ೔  respectively. The 45-degree line demarcates the highest possible import tariff that 
satisfies neutrality for any given tax at Home. For susceptible goods, the maximum neutral tariff 
always exceeds the optimal tariff, regardless of the Home tax level.39 The upshot is that neutral, 
WTO-consistent BCAs do allow a range of economically inefficient BCAs. This is of particular 
concern because neutral BCAs can further protectionist motives under the cloak of legality. 
Figure 2: Optimal and Neutral Tariffs as Function of Home Emissions Tax (Susceptible Goods) 
 
                                                 
38 Equation (7) does not stipulate that optimal tariffs (߬̂௜∗∗) will be linear in	̂ݐு௜. The linearity in Figure 2 is for illustrative purposes only. 
39 Although it may appear counterintuitive, the optimal tariff for a susceptible good is actually 
negative when Home imposes no emissions tax (̂ݐு௜). This is reflected in the negative vertical intercept of the optimal tariff curve and is due to the fact that for a susceptible good, a marginal increase in the 
tariff (weakly) raises global emissions. 
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IV. Extensions 
Our basic model has characterized the globally optimal environmental policies under the 
constraint that policy action is undertaken unilaterally by Home. In this section, we explore the 
implications of relaxing these conditions.40 In particular, we consider cases in which: (a) the 
government in Foreign also levies an emissions tax; (b) Foreign producers respond to Home's 
BCA by adopting less emission-intensive technologies; and (c) the Home government sets 
BCAs with objectives other than global welfare. 
In Section IV.A, we demonstrate that should the government in Foreign also levy an 
emissions tax, the same kind of divergence between neutral and efficient BCAs would remain. 
In Section IV.B, where we allow Foreign producers to adopt less emission-intensive 
technologies in response to Home's BCA, our model produces theoretically ambiguous results:  
an increase in Home's BCA does not necessarily encourage adoption of such technologies. 
Finally, in Section IV.C, we show that where the Home government sets BCAs with objectives 
other than global welfare, neutral BCAs may be driven by protectionist motives. In particular, 
neutral BCAs may reflect Home's exploitation of market power to increase its own aggregate 
                                                 
40 Note that our model does not consider repeated interactions among economic agents in a multi-
period setting. Thus, our results may not represent a long-run equilibrium. Nevertheless, the extensions 
in this section are meant to shed light on possible reactions to BCAs by various economic agents. 
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welfare at the expense of Foreign's welfare. Furthermore, rent-seeking pressures from organized 
industries may lead to further deviations from economic efficiency. 
A. Emissions Tax in Foreign 
Suppose that Foreign has its own emissions tax, represented by tax rates ݐி௜  for 
goods	݅ ൌ 1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊. Without loss of generality, suppose Foreign's emissions tax is still lower 
than Home's. In this case, neutrality stipulates that the carbon content of imported goods cannot 
be taxed at a higher rate than the difference between the Home and Foreign tax rates. Formally, 
a tariff, i, qualifies as neutral if:41 
                ఛ೔ఈಷ೔ ൑
௧ಹ೔
ఈಹ೔ െ
௧ಷ೔
ఈಷ೔ (9) 
 
The divergence between neutral and efficient BCAs persists even in the more general 
case where Foreign producers are also subject to an emissions tax. Corollary 1 establishes that 
if Home taxes emissions at the rate of global marginal damage, the global optimal import tariffs 
continue to be lower than the neutral level. 
Corollary 1 (Second-Best Policy for Global Welfare, Given Foreign Emissions Tax):42 
If Home taxes emissions at the rate of global marginal damage (i.e., ݐு௜ ൌ ሺ ுܰ ൅
ிܰሻߙு௜ݒ′ሺܧሻ for goods ݅ ൌ 1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊), and Foreign has an emissions tax, represented by tax 
rates ݐி௜ for goods ݅ ൌ 1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊, the optimal import tariffs are: 
                       ߬௜ ൌ ሾሺேಹାேಷሻఈಷ೔௩
ᇲሺாሻି௧ಷ೔ሿ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ
௒ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ
. (10) 
Corollary 1 generalizes Proposition 1 by characterizing the optimal BCAs for an 
arbitrary rate of emissions taxation in Foreign. Even with this generalization, the optimal 
BCAs diverge from those permitted under the NT-principle. Specifically, NT-neutrality will 
permit ߬௜ to be set as high as	ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻߙி௜ݒᇱሺܧሻ െ ݐி௜, while Equation (10) indicates that the 
optimal tariff is clearly lower than this. 
                                                 
41 Equation (1) thus represents a special case of Equation (9), where tFi = 0.  
42 Please refer to Appendix B.5 for a proof of this corollary. 
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B.  Adoption of Cleaner Production Technologies in Foreign 
Our basic model assumes that the emission intensities of goods produced is exogenously 
determined. However, one ostensible aim of BCAs is to encourage the adoption of less 
emission-intensive production technologies in the unregulated country (i.e., Foreign). Suppose 
Foreign producers of good i can reduce emission intensity by r tons per unit of output, at a cost 
C(r), where the function C is increasing and convex in r. By construction, Foreign producers of 
good i are subject to a lower BCA if they reduce their emission-intensity. The lower BCA, in 
turn, entails their output fetching a higher price. In Appendix B.6, we solve for the profit-
maximizing level of emission-intensity reduction (i.e., r) as a function of the BCA rate. 
Somewhat counter intuitively, a higher BCA rate does not always lead to a greater 
reduction in emission intensity. In the particular case where Home starts with no BCA, a 
marginal increase in the BCA rate does unambiguously induce Foreign producers to reduce 
their emission intensity. However, this result does not necessarily hold if Home marginally 
increases an already high BCA rate. At a sufficiently high BCA rate, a one-unit reduction in 
emission intensity can be so effective in engendering a higher price that any further increase in 
the BCA rate may actually induce Foreign producers to choose a lower level of r.43 This 
theoretical result is an environmental analogue of the well-known, backward-bending labor 
supply curve, where at a sufficiently high wage, an increase in the wage actually causes 
workers to work less.44 
In summary, taking into account the effects on clean technology adoption in Foreign can 
provide analytical justification for a higher BCA, but only up to a point. Beyond that point, 
further increases in the BCA rate may even be counterproductive in promoting less emission-
intensive production technologies. This effect has the potential to compound the economic 
inefficiencies already inherent in the highest NT-neutral BCAs.  
C. Objectives other than Global Welfare 
                                                 
43 Please refer to Appendix B.6 for mathematical details. 
44 This is due to the domination of the income effect over the substitution effect (Varian, 1999). 
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The discussion thus far has focused on optimal policies for maximizing global welfare, 
albeit in second- and third-best settings. We now consider how tariffs will be determined when 
the Home government is concerned with overall domestic welfare rather than global welfare. 
Proposition 4 (Tariffs that Maximize Home Welfare, Given a Pre-existing Emissions 
Tax):45 
If Home already imposes a previously determined emissions tax, represented by tax rates 
̂ݐு௜ for goods ݅ ൌ 1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊, the following tariffs maximize Home welfare: 
																								߬̂௜∗ ൌ ேಹఈಷ೔௩
ᇲሺாሻ௒ಷ೔ᇲ
௒ಷ೔ᇲ ି஽ಷ೔ᇲ
െ ൣேಹఈಹ೔௩ᇲሺாሻି௧መಹ೔൧ሺଵିథ೔ሻ௒ಹ೔ᇲథ೔∗ൣ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ൧ ൅
௣೔
ఢಷ೔೉
	, (11) 
where	߳ி௜௑  denotes the price elasticity of Foreign export supply.46 
Two important differences between ߬̂௜∗∗ and ߬̂௜∗ are evident. First, the initial two terms 
of 	߬̂௜∗ , while resembling ߬̂௜∗∗  in structure, do not include marginal environmental damage 
occurring in Foreign. 47  This occurs because the Home government does not take into 
consideration environmental damage abroad.48 For susceptible goods, the lack of concern for 
Foreign environmental damage exerts upward pressure on tariffs (see Appendix B.7.b.) 
Second, ߬̂௜∗  includes a terms-of-trade effect, 	 ௣೔ఢಷ೔೉ , which is absent in ߬̂௜
∗∗  and reflects 
Home's exercise of market power. Because Home is a large country whose actions affect world 
prices, it may set higher tariffs on all goods to increase its aggregate welfare at the expense of 
Foreign welfare.49 Ordinarily, setting any tariff with the sole purpose of exploiting market 
power would violate GATT. Of course, WTO members are aware of this and might impose a 
BCA ostensibly to offset a domestic emission tax. As shown in the preceding section, such 
                                                 
45 Please refer to Appendix B.7.a for a proof of Proposition 4. 
46 ߳ி௜௑ ≡ ቀങሺೊಷ೔షವಷ೔ሻങ೛೔ ቁ ቀ
೛೔
൫ೊಷ೔షವಷ೔൯
ቁ. 
47 Formally, instead of NH+NF, ߬̂௜∗ only contains NH. 
48 Although we have taken the domestic emissions tax as pre-determined, the indifference to Foreign 
environmental damage would also cause Home to set a lower emissions tax on domestic producers. If 
maximizing Home welfare only, taxes would be set to ݐு௜∗ ൌ ܰுߙு௜ݒ′ሺܧሻ rather than ሺܰு ൅
ிܰሻߙு௜ݒ′ሺܧሻ. 
49 In the case where Home is a net exporter, the terms-of-trade effect drives the export subsidy lower. 
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protectionist motives would not be entirely curtailed by meeting the neutrality requirement, 
which does not always foreclose tariffs set at above economically efficient levels. 
While Proposition 4 illustrates how neutral BCAs that maximize Home welfare can be 
suboptimal from the standpoint of global welfare, it is also possible that neutral BCAs can come 
short of maximizing Home welfare. This insight stems from Grossman and Helpman's 1994 
work on the political economy of protectionism. In their "Protection-for-Sale" model, politically 
organized industries seek to influence the tariff structure via financial contributions to the Home 
government. Industries desire higher tariffs on the goods they produce but lower tariffs on other 
goods (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). The Home government, on its part, maximizes a 
weighted sum of domestic welfare and industry contributions. In this setting, industry lobbying 
creates a pattern of deviations from Home-welfare-maximizing tariffs, with tariffs for organized 
sectors pushed higher and those for unorganized sectors pushed lower.50 In light of Grossman 
and Helpman's (1994) results (and basic public choice intuition), even NT-neutral BCAs might 
be arrived at in this manner. 
In summary, where the Home government is concerned with domestic rather than global 
welfare and is subject to pressure from organized industries, tariff inefficiencies will result. The 
sources for these inefficiencies include: (i) the exploitation of market power to increase Home 
welfare at the expense of Foreign welfare; and (ii) lobbying activity of organized industries to 
raise tariff levels on their own goods and lower those on other goods. Taking these factors into 
account, there is the real possibility that BCAs for susceptible goods produced by organized 
industries will be set higher than the global welfare-maximizing level, while still being 
economically neutral. The influence of industry lobbying also generates inefficiencies even if 
only Home welfare is considered. Moreover, apart from the inefficiencies in the tariffs 
themselves, additional welfare loss occurs due to the wasteful use of resources in rent-seeking 
activity (i.e., political contributions, etc.).  
Conclusion 
                                                 
50 Note that these deviations follow a modified Ramsey rule, as the Home government seeks 
to minimize deadweight loss while satisfying lobby demands. Moreover, the Home government's 
relative weighting of contributions versus overall welfare influences the magnitude of all 
deviations. The more the Home government cares about national welfare relative to contributions, 
the smaller will be the deviations. 
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This article explores the tension between neutrality and efficiency: we used the GATT 
art. XX environmental exception to justify NT-neutral BCAs (a controversial u-PPM measure) 
and compared these to global welfare-maximizing BCAs. We then demonstrated through our 
general equilibrium model that, in certain situations, a neutral BCA might be set with little or no 
regard to global economic efficiency, likely in response to industry lobbying demands. Thus, 
NT-neutrality can afford excessive leniency in that it does not foreclose tariffs set at above the 
economically efficient level. Worse, resort to the GATT art. XX environmental exception would 
not foreclose even more trade-restrictive measures, such as non-neutral tariffs and, possibly, 
bans, as in US–Shrimp/Turtle Compliance.  
Concerns about leniency notwithstanding, NT-neutrality does have the advantage of 
being relatively straightforward to operationalize by reference to well-articulated WTO 
standards (and to enforce, through Member-to-Member consultation, and, if necessary, bilateral 
adjudication before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body). Efficiency, though complex, can be 
conceptually formalized and yield important policy insights. In the real world, however, the 
informational requirements for evaluating BCAs on the grounds of economic efficiency might 
be administratively and statistically prohibitive. This imposes a challenge to policymakers who 
might consider BCAs: unilaterally imposed, WTO-neutral BCAs can be instrumental in paving 
the way to addressing carbon leakage, but they are susceptible to protectionist rent-seeking 
pressures. Our analysis of the relationship between these two concepts only strengthens the case 
for multilateral alternatives that can be effective in curbing global GHG emissions, arguably this 
century's greatest coordination challenge. 
 
Appendix A 
A.1. Why Rebating Taxes on Exports Is Not a Subsidy 
GATT follows the "Destination Principle" of taxation, according to which goods are 
taxed in the country where consumption takes place.51 This principle allows Home—the place 
of consumption—to impose adjustments to imports in order to preserve the competitive parity 
between domestic, taxed products and foreign, untaxed products.52 A corollary to this principle 
is the exemption or remission of taxes born by products made in Home that are bound to 
Foreign, because consumption will take place abroad. Generally speaking, Home's discretion to 
tax and, thus, remit taxes is an internal, sovereign prerogative.53 However, Home's discretion on 
how much to rebate on such outbound goods is subject to limitations under trade law.   
Although preventing rebates on export transactions from becoming subsidies is a major 
concern in international trade law, the WTO system's approach to the use of rebates in export 
transactions is generally permissive (i.e., except in the case of direct taxes). For instance, note 1 
of Article 1.1(ii) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties ("SCM Agreement") 
expressly excludes export rebates (also known as "export BTAs") from the definition of 
"subsidy" (SCM Agreement, 1994). That is, Home can institute export BCAs, so long as they 
are less than or equivalent to the indirect taxes Home imposes on domestic products. By 
allowing Home to rebate such taxes on exports, the SCM reestablishes symmetry between like 
products made in both regulating (Home) and non-regulating (Foreign) markets.  
A.2. BCAs and MFN-Neutrality 
Besides requiring Members not to discriminate between imports and domestic products, 
the GATT also requires importing Members not to discriminate on the basis of national origin. 
Article I provides:  
                                                 
51 The adopted 1970 GATT Working Party analysis of BTAs endorsed the application of the 
Destination Principle to BTAs (1970 GATT Working Party on BTAs, 1970; WTO, 1997 CTE Report). 
52 Note that paragraphs 4 and 9 of the 1970 GATT Working Party on BTAs discuss this principle, 
including an explanation that, to most members, "the philosophy behind the provisions was the ensuring 
of a certain trade neutrality." 
53 As described in Section I, we assume that Foreign imposes no carbon taxes or charges on similar 
products, whether they are produced domestically or elsewhere.  
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With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation or exportation . . . and with respect to all matters 
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favor, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally 
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties. 
At the outset, we note that because our model involves only two countries—with one being a 
foreign country—issues regarding MFN-neutrality are naturally not specified and discussed 
beyond Section I (see Equation (2)). With this caveat, let us begin by first discussing how 
carbon-taxing Members can meet the MFN Principle when considering imports.  We 
subsequently consider exports.  
A.2.a. BCAs and MFN-Import Neutrality 
Home may consider complying with its MFN obligation in two different ways. First, it 
may impose a BCA that, though not protectionist in intent, differentiates among imports 
originating from different Members (e.g., "Foreign A," "Foreign B," etc.), depending on 
whether and how they impose carbon taxes or charges. For instance, Foreign A's adoption of 
taxes based on a "predominant method of production" that resemble Home's could lead Home to 
charge a lower or no BCA on Foreign A's imports. In contrast, Foreign B's lack of carbon taxes 
or low taxation on much more carbon-inefficient production would justify a relatively higher 
BCA. Thus, any differentiation Home imposes on the treatment of imports from Foreign A and 
Foreign B would be solely based on two origin-neutral criteria: (i) their relative emission 
intensities; and (ii) the level of taxation (if any) that Foreign A and Foreign B imposes.  
In principle, such an adjustable import BCA would be MFN-compliant. In an 
unappealed portion of a WTO Panel Report , panelists agreed that "conditions attached to . . . an 
advantage [in treatment] . . . [do] not necessarily imply that such conditions are discriminatory 
with respect to the origin of imported products" (Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automotive Industry, 2000). 54 The panel upheld the facial legality of Canada's 
import duty exemption to vehicles from certain Members, not others. Of course, Canada–Autos 
                                                 
54 The final Appellate Body Report in this dispute focused solely on whether the challenged measure 
(i.e., Canada's duty exemption to imports from certain countries) violated the MFN Principle (Appellate 
Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, 2000).  
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has great practical relevance to Foreign A: allowing Home not to tax Foreign A's imports—
premised, of course, on certain legitimate "conditions"—enables Foreign A to keep the revenue 
from its carbon taxation without prejudice to its exports to Home.  
An alternative, MFN-compliant manner of administering import BCAs would have 
Home apply an across-the-board, uniform rate to all imports that compete with taxed, domestic 
like products. From Home's perspective, such a BCA would not take into account the absence of 
or differences in levels of carbon taxation in Foreign A and Foreign B. Quite simply, Home 
would fix a tax based on Home's predominant (domestic) method of production for each good 
and replicate that tax as an adjustment to imports. As indicated in Appendix A.1, upon export, 
Foreign A would rebate carbon taxes or charges imposed on its goods, while Foreign B could 
not, for doing so, would be a prohibited export subsidy. Because Foreign A would be 
disinclined to forgo its carbon tax revenue, it is likely that Foreign A would be motivated to 
negotiate an international treaty with Home that exempts its imports from Home's tariffs based 
on their similar carbon stringency. Canada–Autos shows that the WTO system does not 
foreclose this type of solution.  
A.2.b. BCAs and MFN-Export Neutrality 
Let us now assume that Foreign B, in anticipation to Home's collection of BCAs on 
Foreign B's products, decides to adopt export taxes with the expectation that Home will exempt 
them. Assume further that in Foreign B's trade with Foreign C —who also has no carbon tax or 
charge—Foreign B decides not to impose any export tax. Clearly, Foreign B's original purpose 
is to capture revenue that Home would otherwise collect. Of course, as the discussion above (see 
A.2.a) explained, Home, the destination country, would not be under any obligation to account 
for Foreign B's taxation—Home's authority under GATT to impose a BCA is premised on 
Foreign B's non-taxation of emissions on production, not on its non-taxation of exports. In fact, 
in this scenario, Home might be better served by imposing a straightforward uniform rate to 
imports, regardless of how they are produced. That being the case, double taxation would occur, 
and Foreign B's decision to continue taxing would be rational only if Foreign B valued Home's 
loss of revenue (due to declining imports from Foreign B) more than Foreign B's producers' loss 
of market share (in Home).  
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Regardless, Foreign B's conduct would violate MFN-neutrality by imposing an export 
charge that discriminates on the basis of country of destination. This point should not be lost on 
protectionist, non-carbon-restricting countries. 
Appendix B 
B.1. Marginal Effect of Tax and Tariff on World Price 
To obtain the marginal effect of an increase in tHi on pi, we implicitly differentiate the 
market clearing condition: 
ܦு௜ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻ െ ுܻ௜ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ െ ݐு௜ሻ ൌ ிܻ௜ሺ݌௜ሻ െ ܦி௜ሺ݌௜ሻ, (B.1) 
yielding: 
߲݌௜ܦு௜ᇱ ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻ െ ߲݌௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ െ ݐு௜ሻ ൅ ߲ݐு௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ െ ݐு௜ሻ ൌ ߲݌௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ ሺ݌௜ሻ െ ߲݌௜ܦி௜ᇱ ሺ݌௜ሻ.(B.2) 
Rearranging Equation (B.2), we obtain: 
ߜ௜ ≡ డ௣೔డ௧ಹ೔ ൌ
௒ಹ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ାఛ೔ି௧ಹ೔ሻ
ൣ௒ಹ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ାఛ೔ି௧ಹ೔ሻି஽ಹ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ାఛ೔ሻ൧ାൣ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ൧
. (B.3) 
It is evident that ߜ௜ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ. 
Similarly, implicit differentiation of the market clearing condition also yields the 
marginal effect of an increase in τi on pi: 
െ߶௜ ≡ డ௣೔డఛಹ೔ ൌ
ିൣ௒ಹ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ାఛ೔ି௧ಹ೔ሻି஽ಹ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ାఛ೔ሻ൧
ൣ௒ಹ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ାఛ೔ି௧ಹ೔ሻି஽ಹ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ାఛ೔ሻ൧ାൣ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ൧
. (B.4) 
It is evident that ߶௜ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ. 
B.2. Proof of Proposition 1 
Individuals have identical quasilinear and additively separable preferences over the 
goods. Letting ci denote consumption of good i, individual utility from consumption is: 
ݑሺܿ଴, . 	. 	. , ܿ௡ሻ ൌ 	 ܿ଴ ൅ ∑ ݑ௜ሺܿ௜ሻ௡௜ୀଵ , (B.5) 
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where each function ui is strictly increasing and concave in its argument. Utility maximization 
subject to a budget constraint leads to an individual demand function, di, for each good	݅ ൌ
0, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊.55 
Table B.1 summarizes the components of global welfare as a function of taxes and 
tariffs: 
Table B.1: Components of Global Welfare 
Home Labor Income ܮு 
Foreign Labor Income ܮி 
Home Rents from Sector-Specific Inputs ෍ ߎு௜ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ െ ݐு௜ሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
Foreign Rents from Sector-Specific Inputs ෍ ߎி௜ሺ݌௜ሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
Home Tax Revenue ෍ ݐு௜ ுܻ௜ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ െ ݐு௜ሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
Home Tariff Revenue ෍ ߬௜ ∗ ሺܦு௜ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻ െ ுܻ௜ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ െ ݐு௜ሻሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
Home Consumer Surplus ுܰ෍ ሾݑ௜ሺ݀௜ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻ െ ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻ݀௜ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻሿ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
Foreign Consumer Surplus ிܰ ෍ ሾݑ௜൫݀௜ሺ݌௜ሻ൯ െ ݌௜݀௜ሺ݌௜ሻሿ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
(less) Global Damage from Emissions ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻݒሺܧሻ 
 
When the only available policy options are an emissions tax at Home along with tariffs 
on imports from Foreign, global welfare is maximized by solving the following problem: 
ܯܽݔሼ௧ಹ೔,ఛ೔ሽ೔సభ೙ ܮு ൅ ܮி ൅ ∑ ሾߎு௜ ൅ ߎி௜ ൅ ݐு௜ ுܻ௜ ൅ ߬௜ ∗ ሺܦு௜ െ ுܻ௜ሻሿ௡௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ሾ ுܰሾݑ௜ െ௡௜ୀଵሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻ݀௜ሿ ൅ ிܰሾݑ௜ െ ݌௜݀௜ሿሿ െ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻݒሺܧሻሿ. (B.6) 
After applying the Envelope Theorem and Hotelling's Lemma56, the first order conditions with 
respect to ሼݐு௜ሽ௜ୀଵ௡  can be expressed as: 
ݐு௜ሺߜ௜ െ 1ሻ ுܻ௜ᇱ ൅ ߬௜ሾߜ௜ܦு௜ᇱ െ ሺߜ௜ െ 1ሻ ுܻ௜ᇱ ሿ ൌ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻݒᇱሺܧሻሾሺߜ௜ െ 1ሻߙு௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ ൅ ߜ௜ߙி௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ ሿ	∀	݅ ∈ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ, (B.7) 
                                                 
55 Under quasilinear utility, demand for any non-numeraire good depends only on its own price 
(including any tariff), and all residual income is spent on the numeraire good. No consumer surplus is 
derived from the numeraire good. 
56 The first order condition from utility maximization is that ݑᇱ௜൫݀௜ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻ൯ ൌ ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜	∀	݅ ∈
ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ. Hotelling's Lemma refers to the result that the supply function (YHi or YFi) is the first 
derivative of the profit function, i.e. YHi = Π'Hi and YFi = Π'Fi ∀ ݅ ∈ 1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊. 
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and the first order conditions with respect to ሼ߬௜ሽ௜ୀଵ௡  can be expressed as: 
ݐு௜ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻ ுܻ௜ᇱ ൅ ߬௜ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻሾܦு௜ᇱ െ ுܻ௜ᇱ ሿ ൌ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻݒᇱሺܧሻሾሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻߙு௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ െ ߶௜ߙி௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ ሿ	∀	݅ ∈ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ. (B.8) 
Let XFi ≡ YFi - DFi denote Foreign export supply of good i.57 Noting that ߜ௜ܦு௜ᇱ െ
ሺߜ௜ െ 1ሻ ுܻ௜ᇱ ൌ ߜ௜ሺ ிܻ௜ᇱ െ ܦி௜ᇱ ሻ andሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻሾܦு௜ᇱ െ ுܻ௜ᇱ ሿ ൌ ߶௜ሾܦி௜ᇱ െ ிܻ௜ᇱ ሿ, we simultaneously solve 
the n pairs of first order conditions to obtain the optimal taxes: 
ݐு௜∗∗ ൌ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻߙு௜ݒᇱሺܧሻ	∀	݅ ∈ ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ, (B.9) 
and tariffs: 
߬௜∗∗ ൌ ሺேಹାேಷሻఈಷ೔௩
ᇲሺாሻ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ
௒ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ
ൌ ሺேಹାேಷሻఈಷ೔௩ᇲሺாሻఢಷ೔ೊ௫ಷ೔ఢಷ೔೉ 	∀	݅ ∈ ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ. (B.10) 
where ݔி௜ ≡ ೉ಷ೔ೊಷ೔ is the Foreign export to output ratio, ߳ி௜௒ ≡ ቀ
ങೊಷ೔
ങ೛೔ ቁ ቀ
೛೔
ೊಷ೔ቁ is the price elasticity of 
Foreign output and ߳ி௜௑ ≡ ቀങ೉ಷ೔ങ೛೔ ቁ ቀ
೛೔
೉ಷ೔ቁ is the price elasticity of Foreign export supply.58 
The tariffs follow a modified Ramsey rule, i.e., all else equal, goods that have lower 
export supply or import demand elasticity (in absolute value) will have higher optimal tariffs, as 
the deadweight loss from tariffs on such goods is relatively lower. Proposition 1 also stipulates, 
all else equal, a higher tariff on goods whose Foreign production is more responsive to price 
changes. Because tariffs curtail Foreign production and emissions by lowering the world price 
of a good, it is economically efficient to impose higher tariffs on goods whose Foreign output 
responds to price more strongly. 
B.3. Proof of Proposition 2 
Suppose the emissions tax at Home is pre-determined (represented by tax rates ̂ݐு௜ for 
goods	݅ ൌ 1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊), and the only available policy choices are tariffs on imports from Foreign. 
Global welfare is maximized by solving the following problem: 
ܯܽݔሼఛ೔ሽ೔సభ೙ ܮு ൅ ܮி ൅ ∑ ሾߎு௜ ൅ ߎி௜ ൅ ̂ݐு௜ ுܻ௜ ൅ ߬௜ ∗ ሺܦு௜ െ ுܻ௜ሻሿ௡௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ሾ ுܰሾݑ௜ െ௡௜ୀଵሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻ݀௜ሿ ൅ ிܰሾݑ௜ െ ݌௜݀௜ሿሿ െ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻݒሺܧሻሿ. (B.11) 
                                                 
57 XFi would represent Foreign import demand if negative. 
58 This would be the elasticity of import demand if Foreign is a net importer and would take on a 
negative value. 
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After applying the Envelope Theorem and Hotelling's Lemma, the first order conditions 
with respect to ሼ߬௜ሽ௜ୀଵ௡  can be expressed as: 
̂ݐு௜ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻ ுܻ௜ᇱ ൅ ߬௜ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻሾܦு௜ᇱ െ ுܻ௜ᇱ ሿ ൌ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻݒᇱሺܧሻሾሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻߙு௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ െ ߶௜ߙி௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ ሿ	∀	݅ ∈ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ. (B.12) 
Noting that	ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻሾܦு௜ᇱ െ ுܻ௜ᇱ ሿ ൌ ߶௜ሾܦி௜ᇱ െ ிܻ௜ᇱ ሿ, Equation (B.12) can be rearranged to 
yield the optimal tariffs: 
߬పෝ∗∗ ൌ ߬௜∗∗ െ ൣሺேಹାேಷሻఈಹ೔௩
ᇲሺாሻି௧መಹ೔൧ሺଵିథ೔ሻ௒ಹ೔ᇲ
థ೔∗ൣ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ൧
	∀	݅ ∈ ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ. (B.13) 
B.4. Proof of Proposition 3 
Rearranging the expression for ߬పෝ∗∗  contained in Equation (B.13), we find that the 
efficient tariff is strictly less than the highest permitted tariff under neutrality if: 
ሺேಹାேಷሻ௩ᇲሺாሻൣథ೔ఈಷ೔௒ಷ೔ᇲ ିሺଵିథ೔ሻఈಹ೔௒ಹ೔ᇲ ൧
ఈಷ೔∗థ೔∗ൣ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ൧
൅ ௧መಹ೔௒ಹ೔ᇲఈಷ೔∗ൣ௒ಹ೔ᇲ ି஽ಹ೔ᇲ ൧ ൏
௧መಹ೔
ఈಹ೔. (B.14) 
While the left-hand side of Equation (B.14) is not generally lower than the right-hand 
side, we can characterize conditions under which it would be unambiguously lower. Suppose 
Foreign production of good i is at least as emission-intensive as Home production of good i 
(i.e.,	ߙி௜ ൒ ߙு௜). This guarantees that the second term of the left-hand side is strictly less than or 
equal to the right-hand side (i.e.,		 ௧መಹ೔௒ಹ೔ᇲఈಷ೔∗ൣ௒ಹ೔ᇲ ି஽ಹ೔ᇲ ൧ ൏
௧መಹ೔
ఈಹ೔). Turning to the first term of the left-hand 
side, we see that its sign depends on the sign of ߶௜ߙி௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ െ ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻߙு௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ , which is the net 
decrease in global emissions due to a marginal increase in the tariff.59 If a marginal increase in 
the tariff raises Home emissions more than it lowers Foreign emissions, then the first term will 
be negative. Thus, in the case where the second left-hand-side-term is less than or equal to ௧መಹ೔ఈಹ೔, 
and the first term is negative, the entire left-hand side is less than the right-side side, which 
means the efficient tariff is unambiguously less than the highest permitted tariff under 
neutrality.  
                                                 
59 Marginally increasing the tariff has two opposing effects on global emissions. On one hand, it 
leads to lower Foreign production, and consequently lower Foreign emissions, brought about through a 
lower world price. On the other hand, it leads to increased Home production and emissions. Formally, 
the decrease in Foreign emissions is	߶௜ߙி௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ . The increase in Home emissions is	ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻߙு௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ . 
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B.5. Proof of Corollary 1 
Suppose Foreign producers face a pre-determined emissions tax represented by tax rates 
ݐி௜ for goods i=1, . . ., n. If the only available policy levers are an emissions tax at Home along 
with tariffs on imports from Foreign, global welfare is maximized by solving the following 
problem: 
ܯܽݔሼ௧ಹ೔,ఛ೔ሽ೔సభ೙ ܮு ൅ ܮி ൅ ∑ ሾߎு௜ ൅ ߎி௜ ൅ ݐு௜ ுܻ௜ ൅ ݐி௜ ிܻ௜ ൅ ߬௜ ∗ ሺܦு௜ െ ுܻ௜ሻሿ௡௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ሾ ுܰሾݑ௜ െ௡௜ୀଵሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻ݀௜ሿ ൅ ிܰሾݑ௜ െ ݌௜݀௜ሿሿ െ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻݒሺܧሻሿ (B.15) 
After applying the Envelope Theorem and Hotelling's Lemma,the first order conditions 
with respect to ሼݐு௜ሽ௜ୀଵ௡  can be expressed as: 
ݐு௜ሺߜ௜ െ 1ሻ ுܻ௜ᇱ ൅ ߬௜ሾߜ௜ܦு௜ᇱ െ ሺߜ௜ െ 1ሻ ுܻ௜ᇱ ሿ ൌ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻݒᇱሺܧሻሾሺߜ௜ െ 1ሻߙு௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ ൅ ߜ௜ߙி௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ ሿ െݐி௜ߜ௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ 	∀	݅ ∈ ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ, (B.16) 
and the first order conditions with respect to ሼ߬௜ሽ௜ୀଵ௡  can be expressed as: 
ݐு௜ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻ ுܻ௜ᇱ ൅ ߬௜ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻሾܦு௜ᇱ െ ுܻ௜ᇱ ሿ ൌ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻݒᇱሺܧሻሾሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻߙு௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ െ ߶௜ߙி௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ ሿ ൅ݐி௜߶௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ 	∀	݅ ∈ ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ. (B.17) 
Noting that ߜ௜ܦு௜ᇱ െ ሺߜ௜ െ 1ሻ ுܻ௜ᇱ ൌ ߜ௜ሺ ிܻ௜ᇱ െ ܦி௜ᇱ ሻ  and ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻሾܦு௜ᇱ െ ுܻ௜ᇱ ሿ ൌ ߶௜ሾܦி௜ᇱ െ
ிܻ௜ᇱ ሿ, we simultaneously solve the n pairs of first order conditions to obtain the optimal taxes: 
ݐு௜ ൌ ሺ ுܰ ൅ ிܰሻߙு௜ݒᇱሺܧሻ	∀	݅ ∈ ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ, (B.18) 
and tariffs: 
߬௜ ൌ ሾሺேಹାேಷሻఈಷ೔௩
ᇲሺாሻି௧ಷ೔ሿ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ
௒ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ሺ௣೔ሻ
ൌ ሾሺேಹାேಷሻఈಷ೔௩ᇲሺாሻି௧ಷ೔ሿఢಷ೔ೊ௫ಷ೔ఢಷ೔೉ 	∀	݅ ∈ ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ. (B.19) 
In the special case where Foreign has an emissions tax of zero (i.e., 	ݐி௜ ൌ 0	݂݋ݎ	݅ ∈
ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ), the result is identical to that of Proposition 1. 
B.6. Profit-maximizing Emission Intensity Reduction in Foreign 
Let	ߙிపതതതത denote the baseline emission-intensity of good i production in Foreign. Suppose 
Foreign producers of good i can reduce emission intensity below this baseline rate by r tons per 
unit of output, at a cost C(r), where the function C is increasing and convex in r. The emission- 
intensity of Foreign production of good is thus	ߙி௜ ≡ ߙிపതതതത െ ݎ. 
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Home imposes a BCA on imports from Foreign, represented by good-specific 
tariffs 	߬௜	݂݋ݎ	݅ ∈ ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ . The good-specific tariff 	߬௜  can expressed in terms of an 
undifferentiated BCA rate (߬ ), multiplied by good i's emissions intensity of production in 
Foreign (ߙி௜). Formally, imports of good i from Foreign ultimately face a tariff of	߬௜ ≡ ߬ߙி௜ ≡
߬ሺߙிపതതതത െ ݎሻ. 
Foreign producers benefit from emission-intensity reductions via lower tariffs. 60 
However, reduction in emissions intensity are costly. This trade-off is captured in the following 
problem, where producers of good i choose a profit-maximizing level of emission-intensity 
reduction: 
ܯܽݔ௥	ߎி௜ሺ݌௜ሻ െ ܥሺݎሻ. (B.20) 
After applying Hotelling's Lemma, the first order condition with respect to ݎ can be 
expressed as: 
ிܻ௜ ∗ ߶௜ ∗ ߬ ൌ ܥ′ሺݎሻ. (B.21) 
The effect of an increase in the BCA rate (߬) on emission-intensity reduction (r) can be 
obtained by implicitly differentiating Equation (B.21): 
డ௥
డఛ ൌ
ቀഀಷഢതതതതതതషೝഓ ቁ൤௒ಷ೔ᇲ థ೔మఛమା௒ಷ೔ቀ
ങഝ೔
ങೝ ቁఛି
಴ᇲሺೝሻ
ഀಷഢതതതതതതషೝ൨
ቂ௒ಷ೔ᇲ థ೔మఛమା௒ಷ೔ቀങഝ೔ങೝ ቁఛି஼ᇲᇲሺ௥ሻቃ
. (B.22) 
By the second order sufficient condition of the profit-maximization problem, the 
denominator of Equation (B.22) is unambiguously negative. However, the sign of the numerator 
is ambiguous. This means that it is impossible to generally characterize whether an increase in 
the BCA rate leads to more emission-intensity reduction. 
In the limiting case where 	߬  tends to zero, a marginal increase in 	߬  will cause an 
unboundedly large increase in r.61 However for a sufficiently large	߬, the numerator of Equation 
(B.22) can be positive, implying that a marginal increase in	߬ leads to a decrease in r.  
B.7. Proof of Proposition 4  
                                                 
60 The lower tariffs entail the output of Foreign producers fetching a higher price. 
61 This is because the denominator of Equation (B.22) is unambiguously negative, and C'(r) is 
positive. 
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B.7.a. Tariffs that Maximize Overall Home Welfare 
Suppose the emissions tax at Home is pre-determined (represented by tax rates ̂ݐு௜ for 
goods	݅ ൌ 1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊) and the only available policy choices are tariffs on imports from Foreign. 
Home welfare is maximized by solving the following problem: 
ܯܽݔሼఛ೔ሽ೔సభ೙ ܮு ൅ ∑ ൣߎு௜ ൅ ̂ݐு௜ ுܻ௜ ൅ ߬௜ ∗ ሺܦு௜ െ ுܻ௜ሻ െ ுܰሾݑ௜ െ ሺ݌௜ ൅ ߬௜ሻ݀௜ሿ൧௡௜ୀଵ െ ுܰݒሺܧሻ 
 (B.23) 
(see Table B.1 for a description of the components of welfare.) 
The tariffs that maximize Home welfare are: 
߬̂௜∗ ൌ ఈಷ೔ேಹ௩
ᇲሺாሻ௒ಷ೔ᇲ
௒ಷ೔ᇲ ି஽ಷ೔ᇲ
െ ൣேಹ௩ᇲሺாሻఈಹ೔ି௧መಹ೔൧ሺଵିథ೔ሻ௒ಹ೔ᇲథ೔∗ൣ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ൧ ൅
௣೔
ఢಷ೔೉
	∀	݅ ∈ ሼ1, 	. 	. 	. , 	݊ሽ. (B.24) 
B.7.b. Comparing Tariffs that Maximize Home Welfare with Tariffs that 
Maximize Global Welfare 
The first two terms of ߬̂௜∗ can be rearranged to yield: 
ேಹ௩ᇲሺாሻൣథ೔ఈಷ೔௒ಷ೔ᇲ ିሺଵିథ೔ሻఈಹ೔௒ಹ೔ᇲ ൧
థ೔∗ൣ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ൧
൅ ௧መಹ೔௒ಹ೔ᇲൣ௒ಹ೔ᇲ ି஽ಹ೔ᇲ ൧ 	, (B.25) 
while ߬̂௜∗∗ can be expressed as: 
߬̂௜∗∗ ൌ ሺேಹାேಷሻ௩
ᇲሺாሻൣథ೔ఈಷ೔௒ಷ೔ᇲ ିሺଵିథ೔ሻఈಹ೔௒ಹ೔ᇲ ൧
థ೔∗ൣ௒ಷ೔ᇲ ି஽ಷ೔ᇲ ൧
൅ ௧መಹ೔௒ಹ೔ᇲൣ௒ಹ೔ᇲ ି஽ಹ೔ᇲ ൧ (B.26) 
It can be seen that if good i is a susceptible good (i.e., if	߶௜ߙி௜ ிܻ௜ᇱ െ ሺ1 െ ߶௜ሻߙு௜ ுܻ௜ᇱ ൏
0), then the first two terms of ߬̂௜∗ together exceed	߬̂௜∗∗. 
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